Short answer: On 3 November 2026 a developer reported on X that ChatGPT, asked for the T3 Code download, sent his wife to t33.codes, a near-pixel-perfect clone registered about two weeks earlier, instead of the real t3.codes. T3 Code’s maker, Theo Browne, said the next day that the clone was being recommended “constantly” and that ChatGPT kept recommending it after the site went offline. You can protect yourself by getting a download from the maker’s own repository or docs and comparing its SHA-256 fingerprint with the value the maker publishes. Publishers can keep a dated record of each release file. A TimeBind shows that an exact file existed no later than a recorded time and still matches. It does not show a file is safe, and it does not show a website is official.
Last checked 13 November 2026. General information, not legal or security advice. Everything below about the incident is as reported by the people involved and by the outlets listed under Sources checked. What the lookalike site actually delivered has not been published.
Table of Contents
What was reported
The first report was an X post by Dorian D. on 3 November 2026. He said his wife asked ChatGPT for the T3 Code download and was given t33.codes, “almost pixel-perfect”, registered two weeks earlier, while the real site is t3.codes. Browne, who makes T3 Code, replied on 4 November that the fake “gets recommended by ChatGPT constantly” and asked for help working out why. Later that day he posted that the site was down “but ChatGPT is still recommending it”.
Red Team Partners, a security firm, wrote that the registry record shows the domain was registered on 19 October through Namecheap and was put on client hold on 4 November. It also wrote that no malware analysis of what the site served had been published when it went to press. Tech Times reported that OpenAI had not commented publicly. The cause is not established. Several developers suggested that ChatGPT’s live web search had surfaced the clone from a search index, which fits a domain too new to be in training data, but that is an explanation offered by commentators, not a confirmed finding.
How to check a download you were pointed to
- Do not start from a chatbot answer. Open the product’s official source repository or documentation from a link you already trust, and follow its download link from there.
- Compare the domain character by character. One extra character is the whole trick in this case.
- Find the published SHA-256 value on a second channel such as the maker’s release page in its repository, then fingerprint your downloaded file and compare. The SHA-256 file checker does this in your browser without uploading the file, and how to verify a downloaded file explains the steps.
- Know what a match means. A match tells you that you hold the same bytes the maker published. It does not tell you the maker’s release is free of malware, and a clone site could publish its own hash next to its own file. The comparison only helps when the expected value comes from a channel the attacker does not control.
What publishers should keep for every release
If you ship software, a lookalike site is a dispute about which files and pages are yours. These records help you answer it calmly:
- Every release artefact, with its SHA-256 value, listed in the release notes and in your repository. The bulk SHA-256 manifest builds that list for a whole folder.
- A TimeBind of each release folder or manifest made when you publish. It gives you a dated record that those exact files existed no later than that time and still match. See developer timestamping and source code timestamping.
- Dated captures of your official pages and your repository’s release page, so you can show what your real site said on a given day.
- Your domain registration details and the date you registered the official domain, plus a note of the lookalike’s registrar record and date, if you report it.
- A log of reports: the registrar, the host, search engines and AI providers you contacted, with dates and reply references.
None of this stops an assistant from recommending a clone. It gives you a clean, dated set of facts when you ask a registrar, a host or a platform to act.
What a TimeBind does not do here
A TimeBind of your release files does not make anyone check your hash, and it does not show that a download is safe. It does not stop a search index from ranking a clone. It records timing and integrity for files you hold. For supply-chain events where the question is what a compromised package did, see the GitHub Actions secret-stealer write-up and the fake leak on Hugging Face.
Why people are searching for this
Measured on 13 November 2026: the original X post had 183,945 impressions, 606 likes and 64 bookmarks, and follow-up posts about the clone drew further thousands of impressions. Security firms and tech outlets covered it within days. A June 2026 research study described by Tech Times found malicious destinations in 1.7% of 2,905 assistant answers about login pages and services. We have not reviewed that study ourselves.
Frequently Asked Questions
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Is t33.codes still online?
Red Team Partners reported that the registry put the domain on client hold on 4 November 2026, after which it stopped resolving. Check the current state yourself before relying on that, and do not visit lookalike sites to find out.
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What did the fake site deliver?
Not published. As of the sources below, no malware analysis of what the clone served had been released. Browne called the operators crypto scammers; that is his description, not a technical finding.
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Does a matching SHA-256 value mean a download is safe?
No. It means your file is byte-for-byte the file the value was calculated from. It is only reassuring when the expected value comes from a channel you trust, such as the maker’s repository release page.
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Can a TimeBind stop people being sent to a fake site?
No. A TimeBind is a dated, checkable record that an exact file existed no later than a recorded time and still matches. It helps you document your own release files. It does not control what search engines or assistants recommend.
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What should I do if an assistant sent me to a lookalike?
Do not download or enter details. Report the link to the assistant provider and to the registrar or host if you can identify them, and keep a dated screenshot of the answer and the address. If you already ran something, treat the machine as compromised and follow your security team’s guidance.
Sources checked
- Dorian D. on X, 3 Nov 2026: x.com/doriandeacu/status/2117698026089185753
- Red Team Partners, “ChatGPT sent people to a fake download site. It kept doing it after the site went down.”: redteampartner.com
- Tech Times UK, “AI Assistants Are Recommending Malicious Links When Users Ask for Legitimate Websites”: techtimes.co.uk
- 3way.social, “ChatGPT sent users to a scam clone of T3 Code. Could it happen to your product?”: 3way.social
- Advance Intelligence story of 3 Nov 2026: advanceintelligence.ai
Date your release files before you publish them
Your first Pooled TimeBind is free, with no credit card required. After that, TimeBinds start from US$5, and an ASAP TimeBind is US$15. Click here to start, or see plans and pricing.
